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Chapter 1
The Role of Bank Capital
in an Optimal Contract Environment
1
1 Introduction
Why do we need bank capital? How much bank capital do we need? Should we spend taxpayer’s
money on bailing out and injecting capital to banks? These questions have gained a lot of attention
since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. The crisis was centered in the banking sector and in
the general financial system and clearly demonstrated the importance of well-functioning financial
intermediation. In order to avoid a collapse of the financial system, governments throughout the
developed countries implemented multiple bank bailouts and recapitalization schemes. The debate
about further extending such measures is still ongoing in a number of countries, like Italy, where
bailouts either did not take place during the crisis or proved insufficient for banks to restructure and
resume their normal lending and intermediating activity.
Ever since the crisis entered its most severe period in 2008, there has been a widespread debate
about the role of the financial system in the economy and about possible reforms of the financial
system. For the role of bank capital, or bank equity, the standard of the literature has been works by
Kiyotaki and Gertler (2010, 2016). For the potential changes in the architecture of the financial sys-
tem, some, but by far not all the issues addressed include the very shape of contracts that bank offer
bank, as well as radical proposals to change banks financial structure, including much more bank
capital and equity in the system (see Cochrane (2014) and Admati et al. (2013)). The consequences
of potential bank bailouts and increasing the amount of bank capital has been recently analyzed in
the literature, for example by Begenau (2016).
Financial intermediation based on debt and deposit contracts is a common feature of modern
market economies. A large part of consumers financial assets is held as of bank deposits. Similarly,
many firms rely on bank credit to finance new projects. Most consumers don’t have access to all
the productive projects in the economy. They may also lack the knowledge or the ability to monitor
the activities of firms they invest in, and need specialized institutions to perform these activities,
as discussed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and subsequent work. Since banks may be seen as
institutions that help to overcome these information asymmetries and help allocate consumers re-
sources in projects and firms where they are most productive, bank play a large role in increasing
economy’s overall efficiency. These gains may then be passed on to consumers in form of interest
payments on deposits. Note that at this point banks also play a role in transforming the cash flows
they receive from firms or indebted households in form of diverse return on loans, equity and other
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contracts, into simple debt contracts they operate with consumers. Thus, they allow consumers who
may otherwise lack expertise or information access to indirectly benefit from the productive projects
the banks invest in.
The aim of this work is to provide a framework to think about contracts offered to consumers by
financial intermediaries and the way they depend on equity (capital) held by these intermediaries. I
assume that bankers play a productive role in the economy as they have access to better investment
opportunities than the general public (consumers), either by access to monitoring technology, or
by better access to information, perhaps by centralizing the intermediating activity. It would then
seem desirable that bankers would somehow allow consumers to access their technology, as this
would allow the economy as a whole to produce higher output and most likely increase welfare
of all agents. However, I assume that there is an information asymmetry between the banker and
the consumer, since the return on projects operated by bankers is only observed costlessly by those
bankers. In order for consumers to verify the returns, a cost must be incurred in that some part of
the output is forfeit, as in work of Townsend (1979) and Chari and Kehoe (2016). This leads to
a problem of designing a contract between consumers and bankers that would allow consumers to
invest in bankers technology. It turns out that an optimal contract takes the form of a deposit contract
with bankruptcy. Specifically, the banker promises to pay a certain amount of consumption good to
consumer unless a return on the productive technology makes it unfeasible for the banker to deliver
this return. If this happens, the banker declares bankruptcy, the realization of return is verified, and
all the output net of bankruptcy costs is allocated to consumer.
A crucial feature of the model is that the consumer (depositor) has an outside option of a less
productive “storage” technology and is not compelled to deposit all her endowment with the banker.
She will only do so if the terms of the contracts offered by the banker are attractive enough. This is
where bank capital plays the crucial role. I assume that while investing in the productive technology,
the banker invests her own endowment together with the amount received from the depositor. If
banks hold enough capital, then the amount of bank assets relative to depositor’s contribution is
sufficiently large, and banks will be able to offer better more attractive contracts to consumers:
“more attractive” meaning a combination of lower probability of bankruptcy, as bank capital serves
as a cushion against unfavorable realizations of returns on production, and a higher expected return
on deposits, due to avoiding the costs of potential bankruptcies. As contracts offered by banks
are more attractive, banks will now be able to attract more deposits, which will further increase
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the expected output in the economy and potentially allow to achieve an allocation of resources in
production that would be chosen if consumers could directly access the productive technology.
I then proceed analyze the optimal size of the banking sector in the economy by allowing the
planner to allocate resources between consumers and bankers by redistributing their endowments be-
fore they sign contracts. This is equivalent to bank recapitalization financed by a tax on consumers.
I find out that if the technology operated by bankers is sufficiently attractive relative to technology
operated by consumers, then such transfer may be desirable even if planner cares only about con-
sumers. Namely, the better access to the productive technology through attractive contracts offered
by well-capitalized banks may outweigh the cost of less resources available to consumer after the tax
is implemented. Since the model is highly stylized, it is not yet ready to be brought directly to data.
However, since it develops the features of bank deposit contracts as optimal contracts addressing
a particular information friction and shows how this contract depends on bank capital, I believe it
provides a useful framework to think about the role of bank capital and bank bailouts.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the environment. Section 3
establishes the properties of the optimal contract. Section 4 then analyzes the decision problem of
the depositor facing this optimal contract. Section 5 describes the equilibrium in the model. Section
6 then sets up a numerical experiment and provides a solution to the model for different values of
bank capital. Section 7 deals with a modified problem of a planner who can distribute the resources
between banks and consumers before they sign contracts in order to maximize consumer’s welfare.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Environment
The overall environment is a two-period model with two types of agents. The two types are
called banker and consumer (or depositor), and there is a measure one of each type. Both types
begin with an endowment of an investment good, equal to one for each consumers and n for each
banker. n is a central variable of interest in the model, and will be referred to interchangeably as bank
capital or bank equity. There are two periods in the model, T = {1,2}. In the first period, agents are
free to sign contracts between themselves and make the allocation decisions. In the second period,
a random shock to return on a risky technology is realized, production takes place, contracts are
executed and agents consume their income.
Bankers are risk neutral with a linear utility function over consumption. They operate a produc-
tive technology with a stochastic return described below. Consumers are risk-averse with a utility
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function u that is strictly concave, differentiable and satisfies the usual Inada conditions. Consumers
have access to a “storage” technology, which transfers a unit of endowment in period 1 into a unit
of consumption good in period 2. Alternatively, consumers can sigh contracts with bankers so that
consumers transfer some of their endowment to bankers, bankers then invest it together with their
own endowment in their own “productive” technology, and then return some or all of the output to
consumers as specified in the contract. .
The productive technology operated by bankers is assumed to have constant returns to scale. It
yields a gross stochastic return R for each invested unit. The returns on the technology follow a
distribution F(R) with support R ∈ (0,+∞) and a continuous density f (R), assumed to be strictly
positive over the whole support. In order to make the following contracting problem non-trivial,
I assume that E[R] > 1- i.e. the technology is “productive” in a sense that in expectation it yields
strictly higher return than storage. I assume that the realization of R is identical for all bankers and
thus can be thought of as an aggregate shock. Alternatively, one could think about it as a return on
a portfolio of assets managed by a bank, with each bank holding the exact same portfolio. For the
sake of simplicity, I will take the distribution of R as given and will not deal with asset management
decisions of bankers.
If consumers decide to transfer some resources to bankers for investment, bankers pool these
resources with their own for investment in the stochastic technology. Once R is realized, bankers
are the only agents in the economy who can observe it costlessly. In order to make the realization
of R observed by consumers, bankers must incur a cost equal to a share (1−µ) of total output from
production, with 0 < µ < 1. That is, if A is the total amount of goods invested in the productive
technology, then RA is the realized output of consumption good, and µRA is the amount that can be
distributed between banker and consumer if the value of R has been verified by consumer.
The amount of endowment given (deposited) by consumer to a banker, as well as the way the
proceeds from production are distributed are specified in a contract whose terms will be derived
later. In general, I allow contracts to take any form, but prove that they take the form of deposit
contracts with bankruptcy. Specifically, after production, the banker pays a pre-agreed fixed amount
to consumer unless the return on the risky technology is less than the specific return R˜, in which
case consumers receive all the proceeds from production net of bankruptcy (verification) costs. To
sum up, bankers first gather deposits (denoted as d) from consumers and then invest them together
with their own endowment n in the productive technology. After R is realized, the total amount of
resources available is R(n+d). This is then shared between banker and depositor according to the
contract, possibly also incurring the verification costs.
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3 Optimal contract
As specified before, I allow consumers and bankers to enter any contracts they want. However,
since the expected return on bankers technology is strictly higher than the return on consumer’s tech-
nology and bankers are assumed to be risk averse, the only mutually beneficial contract may involve
transfer of resources from consumers to bankers for bankers to invest it in their own technology. In
this sense, this is a model of financial intermediation. Moreover, the fact that consumers can only
observe the realization of R after incurring a cost1 implies that the optimal contract will take a very
particular form, namely, a deposit contract with bankruptcy, similar to Townsend (1979) and Chari
and Kehoe (2016). A contract is specified by x1 = (d,S,g(R),C), where d is the amount (deposit) the
consumer transfers to a banker in the first period, S is the set of realizations of R for which there is
to be verification (with a complement set S′), g(R) is the transfer from banker to consumer in period
2 when there is verification, andC is the transfer from banker to consumer if there is no verification.
Since the transfer from banker to consumer cannot depend on R if there is no verification, it is an
amount constant for every R ∈ S′. Moreover, since it is the banker who decides whether to submit
to verification, this places an additional restriction on possible payoffs. Finally, similar to Chari and
Kehoe (2016), I will require contracts to be immune to renegotiation, which means that once d is
fixed, there is no other feasible and incentive compatible contract x2 = (S˜, g˜(R),C˜) that makes both
consumers and bankers better off, with at least one of them strictly better off. Hence, without loss
of generality, I will restrict my attention to contracts immune to renegotiation and consider a con-
tracting problem that treats d as given. Since both d and n are fixed once the contracting problem is
set, let A= d+n be a total amount of investment in the productive technology. Finally, let s= 1−d
be the amount that consumer decided to store. The contracting problem is then to maximize con-
sumer’s expected utility subject to feasibility, incentive compatibility and a minimum level of utility
promised to a banker:
Problem 3.1:
max
S,g(R),C
{
ˆ
S
u(s+g(R))dF(R)+
ˆ
S′
u(s+C)dF(R)}
1Whether the cost is paid by banker or by consumer is not relevant
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subject to:
ˆ
S
{µR−g(R)}dF(R)+
ˆ
S′
{R−C}dF(R)≥ K (banker’s utility)
µR−g(R)> R−C∀R ∈ S (incentive compatibility)
C > 0,C ≤ R∀R ∈ S′,0≤ g(R)≤ µR∀R ∈ S (nonnegativity)
A natural, but certainly not the only choice for the minimum level of utility that has to be guar-
anteed to the banker would be K =E[R] ·n, i.e. one making the banker indifferent between engaging
in the contract and autarky, i.e. taking her endowment and operating the productive technology inde-
pendently. Incentive compatibility condition requires that in each state when the banker is supposed
to be subject to verification she finds it beneficial to do so. Note that a simple rearrangement of the
IC constraint implies a relationship for payoffs for consumer in verification versus non-verification
states:
g(R)<C− (1−µ)R<C∀R ∈ S
where the second inequality follows since C > 0 and 0 < µ < 1. This relationship comes useful in
the accompanying proofs.
Characterizing the solution to this problem, I first prove that, as typical for models with costly
state verification, the verification set is the set of values of R below a certain threshold R˜. This is
formally stated in a lemma below:
Lemma: Any solution S?,g?(R),C? to Problem 3.1. has the property that S? = {R : R< R˜} for
some R˜.
Proof: See Appendix.
Moreover, since consumers are assumed to be risk averse, I prove that the optimal contract has
the following features:
Theorem 1: Any solution to problem has the following properties: g?(R) = µAR and the cutoff
level R˜ is determined as R˜= CA .
Proof: See Appendix.
The theorem states that if the banker announces bankruptcy, then all the output from production
net of verification costs is given to the consumer and the payoff to the banker equals zero. Second,
banker only subjects to verification if she cannot meet the payment C promised to consumer under
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no verification. Due to this fact that verification is tied to banker’s payoffs satisfying feasibility
condition, I will further refer to it verification simply as “bankruptcy”.
It is worth noting that proofs above rely heavily on the assumption that the contract with the
banker is the only source of variability in consumer’s consumption. However, this assumption could
be relaxed as long as other sources of variability in consumption, like idiosyncratic risk on storage
technology, are independent of R.
Before proceeding further, let us slightly redefine our variables. Since the above analysis was
performed under the assumption of no renegotiation, the amount of resources contributed by the
depositor (and the banker) was treated as given. However, depositor’s decision about whether to
enter into the contract with the banker is a continuous choice variable rather than simple “participate
or not” choice. Therefore, let us redefine contract variables in terms of consumer’s contribution
(deposit) d and banker’s own capital n. As we discussed before, the total amount of assets invested
in the productive technology is A = d+ n. Let us normalize the fixed transfer in to the consumer
no-bankruptcy states by the amount of resources contributed by the depositor as r = Cd . This way, r
can be interpreted as the (gross) interest rate, or a promised rate of return on consumer’s deposit.
To sum up, the contract is now defined as as x3 = (d, R˜,r), where d is the size of the deposit a
household puts in the bank, R˜ is the value of R below which the bank declares bankruptcy, and r is
the gross rate of return on d that the bank pays to the consumer if there is no bankruptcy. In short,
the payoffs are given by:
If R≥ R˜ and there is no verification:

rd for the depositor
R(n+d)− rd for the banker
and if R< R˜ and the bank declares bankruptcy:

µR(n+d) for the depositor
0 for the banker
Having characterized the optimal contract, we can now proceed to depositor’s portfolio problem.
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4 Depositor’s problem
We will now specify the problem of a depositor who takes the terms of a contract as given.
Formally, this problem is a portfolio problem of allocating consumer’s endowment between one-to-
one storage and making a deposit with the banker. Since I assume an environment in which both
bankers and consumers are atomistic and identical, I assume that the depositor does not internalize
the impact she has on bank’s payoffs. In particular, consumer treats the amount of deposits in
the bank, denoted as D, as given2. This is relevant for the terms of the contract since payoffs to the
consumer in case of bankruptcy, as well as the bankruptcy threshold R˜ both depend on the amount of
deposits. Since consumer treats both the bank capital n and the amount of deposits D as given, this is
equivalent to saying that she takes the whole capital structure as given. Thus, I will take consumer’s
choice d and only compare it to average (or total, since I assume mass one of depositors) deposit
D when analyzing her choice. That individual deposits equal aggregate ones will only be imposed
later as an equilibrium condition.
Since n and D are already given as the aggregate state of the economy, the only variable necessary
to describe the terms of the contract is the interest rate r, paid if there is no bankruptcy. Given this
and the aggregate state and the form of the optimal contract derived in the previous section, the
other terms of the contract, namely the bankruptcy cutoff R˜ and payoffs in case of bankruptcy can be
determined by the consumer without need to specify them any further. Finally, since both storage and
banker’s technology are deal with actual goods, I exclude negative storage or consumer borrowing
from the bank.
Given n and D, which together form the aggregate state for this economy, and the contract offered
to her by banks, summarized by r, consumer solves for portfolio maximizing her expected utility:
Problem 4.1:
max
d∈[0.1]
ˆ
[u(c(R))]dF(R)
where:
cD(R) =

(1−d)+ rd if R≥ R˜
(1−d)+ dDµR(n+D) if R< R˜
2This is a notion very similar to “little k” and “capital K” in a neoclassical growth model.
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After substitution, depositor’s problem can be shortened to:
max
d∈[0,1]
{ˆ R˜
0
[u(1−d+dµR(n+D
D
))]dF(R)+(1−F(R˜)[u(1−d+ rd)]
}
Assuming the solution is internal, i.e. d ∈ (0,1), the first order condition for the depositor is
then:
ˆ R˜
0
u′(1−d+dµR(n+D
D
))(1−µR(n+D
D
))dF(R) = (1−F(R˜))(r−1)u′(1+(r−1)d)
This condition requires the consumer to balance two forces that emerge as the amount deposited
with the banker increases: on one hand, as in the RHS of the FOC, if r > 1, depositing more of the
endowment in a bank allows to increase consumption in states without bankruptcy. On the other, in
particular for realizations of R for which µR( n+DD )< 1, there is a loss of utility in states associated
with bankruptcy.
Since the choice of d is constrained to fall between 0 and 1, corner solutions should also be
discussed. The corner with d = 0 is not very interesting and can be easily discarded if the technology
operated by the banker is sufficiently attractive. This would at the very minimum require E[R]> 0,
which could then hopefully allow bankers to offer contracts with an expected payoffs strictly above
one and therefore attract at least some deposits from consumers. The second corner with d = 1,
where depositors have all their endowments intermediated by bankers is a more interesting one.
This is a solution more likely to occur if the productive technology is sufficiently attractive relative
to storage and its occurrence is likely to create “kinks” in terms of equilibrium contracts seen as a
function of bank capital, as will be shown in following section. From an analytical point of view, it
is important to point to a condition necessary for a d = 1 corner to be a solution. Since u is assumed
to satisfy Inada conditions of limc→0 u(c) =−∞ and limc→0 u′(c) = +∞ and zero is assumed to be a
lower bound of the support of R, for d = 1 to be a solution we have to guarantee that the probability
of extremely low realizations of R is low enough, i.e. that the left tail of the distribution is thin
enough. Consider the limit of the integrated function in the first term of the objective function as R
approaches zero and d = 1:
lim
R→0
u(µR(
n+D
D
)) f (R)
The overall limit depends on the interaction of two terms: utility associated with extremely low
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realizations of R, for whichlimR→0 u(µR( n+DD )) = −∞ by Inada condition, and limR→0 f (R). For
the overall limit to be finite, it is necessary (but not sufficient) that limR→0 f (R) = 0. Among others,
this implies that this corner solution is not feasible if the distribution of R is uniform. For the overall
limit to be finite, we basically need the density function to approach zero “faster” than the utility
approaches negative infinity as R goes to zero, or:
lim
R→0
u(µR(
n+D
D
)) f (R)<M
for some M ∈ R. Economically, this condition states that the probability of extremely low re-
alizations of R is low enough to be disregarded by a risk-averse consumer, or that at least it can
be given a finite value when expected utility is considered. In the numerical experiment below, I
assume the utility function to be CRRA and the returns to follow a log-normal distribution. It can be
shown that for these functional forms, the above condition holds3. Also, it is clear that for the d = 1
to be a possible solution, µ > 0 is also necessary.
5 Equilibrium
Having defined and characterized consumer’s problem in the previous section, we can now de-
fine the general equilibrium in this economy. An equilibrium object (equivalent to a price) that
determines the allocation of resources is the equilibrium contract. This, given the aggregate state
of the economy n, as discussed above, can be summarized by the promised interest rate in case of
bankruptcy, r. The other terms of the contract are then made clear through their relationship with r
and the aggregate state. In order to determine r, it is necessary to specify the market environment
that banks operate in. I assume that the banks operate competitively. In this environment, the terms
of the contract are determined by banker’s outside option, i.e. operating the productive technology
only with their own endowment. This condition, equivalent to a standard zero profit condition, is
formally stated as: ˆ +∞
R˜
{R(n+D)− rD}dF(R) = n
ˆ +∞
0
RdF(R)
Right hand side is simply the expected revenue if bankers just operate their own technology
in isolation, n ·E[R]. The left hand is the expected revenue from offering equilibrium contracts at
price r. Note that I have omitted the integral from 0 to R˜ since by the feature of the equilibrium
3This is shown by applying l’Hospital rule to a slightly rearranged version of this limit for n times, where n≥ σ where σ
is the relative risk aversion parameter in the utility function
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contract, the revenue of the bank for these realizations of R equals zero by the theorem proved in
section 3 - these are the realizations of R for which the banks declares bankruptcy. Hence,
´ R˜
0 (µR−
g(R))dF(R) =
´ R˜
0 0dF(R) = 0.
As we have specified the depositor’s problem in the previous section and introduced the opti-
mal contract and the market environment, we can now define the competitive equilibrium in this
economy.
Definition: A competitive equilibrium in this economy given state n is given by a contract
(r, R˜,g(R)), an aggregate policy D and by a policy function by consumer d such that:
• Given n, D and r, the bankruptcy cutoff R˜ in the equilibrium contract is determined by:
R˜=
D
n+D
r
• Aggregate policy for D is determined by:
D= Γ(n)
• Given n, D, and the equilibrium contract, d solves depositor’s portfolio problem:
max
d∈[0,1]
{ˆ +∞
Rmin
[u(1−d+dµR(n+D
D
))]dF(R)+(1−F(R˜)[u(1−d+ rd)]
}
• Given n, D, and the equilibrium contract, bankers participate in the market and make zero
economic profits: ˆ +∞
R˜
{R(n+D)− rD}dF(R) = n ·E[R]
• Consistency condition:
d = D
Since in section 3 I’ve proved that given endowments and information frictions, the contracts in
this economy are indeed optimal, this implies that the competitive equilibrium in this economy is
efficient.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Symbol Value Comments
σ 5 Risk aversion parameter
µ 0.8 Share of resources recovered from bankruptcy
Technology:
µR 0.02 Return distribution: log-normal
σR 0.05 Mean return: 1.02, Standard deviation 0.05
Theorem 2: Given endowments, competitive equilibrium is efficient.
At this point, it is important to emphasize a dual role that bank capital plays in this model.
First, when operated by bankers, it is used directly as input for production. Second, and more
important for us, it allows bankers to offer better contracts to depositors. Since the realization of
the productivity shock is only observable by bankers and its verification by customers requires a
cost, a higher level of equity allows the banker to either promise higher rates of return to consumers,
or allows her to fulfill her promises for a larger set of realizations of R before the bank runs out
of funds and is forced to declare bankruptcy. Essentially, bank capital serves as a cushion against
unfavorable realizations of output shock. Since customers are aware of this, then a larger amount of
bank capital makes contracts offered by bankers more attractive to depositors, and therefore induce
them to deposit more of their funds in the bank. Since the technology operated by bankers is more
productive than the storage technology operated by depositors, some amount of bank capital may
allow the economy as a whole to approach an allocation of resources in production identical to one
that consumers would choose had they have direct access to the productive technology.
6 Numerical Exercise
6.1 Choice of parameters
Since the analytical solution to the above model is extremely cumbersome, in order to charac-
terize the behavior of the model I turn to a numerical experiment instead. This is to illustrate the
behavior of the model for different values of bank endowment and to check how the allocation and
terms of an equilibrium contract change as I increase the value of bank capital. Since the model
presented in this chapter is mostly illustrative, I do not target any particular moments in the data and
only choose parameter values deemed reasonable. Values of parameters are presented in Table 1.
Consumer preferences are assumed to follow a standard CRRA utility function u(c)= c
1−σ−1
1−σ with
the risk aversion σ = 5. This is somewhat higher than standard estimates, but still falls within a rea-
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sonable range. On the other hand, its value is lower than what is sometimes assumed in financial
literature. Moreover, it partially compensates for the fact that the storage technology is assumed to
be completely safe, which is a useful normalization in terms of presenting the model, but is unlikely
to hold in reality. In practice, we would rather think of bank deposits as helping to avoid some
idiosyncratic risks through diversification rather than generating risks on their own. In any case,
changing the value of σ parameter does not affect the qualitative results of the model.
I assume the returns on bank assets (output of the productive technology operated by bankers)
follow a log-normal distribution with parameters (µR,σR). In the exercise below, I’ve chosen the
parameters to make the productive technology only a little better than the storage technology oper-
ated by consumers. Specifically, I chose µR = 0.02 and σR = 0.05. This leads to mean return on the
technology to be 1.0215 with standard deviation of 0.0511. In particular, this implies that the return
on the productive technology is higher than the return on storage with probability of 65.5%.
It is also worth noting that for these technology parameters, an optimal solution to a problem in
which household had direct access to the productive technology and did not have to rely on interme-
diation neither had it faced bankruptcy costs, features all resources being directed in the productive
technology. Although we should not put too much emphasis on the frictionless problem, it may
still serve as a benchmark at least in terms of whether the environment with frictional environment
features the same allocation of resources in production.
Finally, I choose the parameter associated with bankruptcy costs as µ = 0.80. This implies that
if the bank announces bankruptcy, 20% of its resources are lost and the rest can be returned to
households. I deem this to be a relatively conservative value in that the bankruptcy costs are not
excessively large. Note that the bankruptcy costs do not translate directly into recovery rates since
recovery rates in this model would be computed against promised payment, rd, and not realized
return on assets, R(n+ d) and would almost always be smaller thanµ . The value of µ of 0.8 still
seems reasonable and potentially even high, since historic recovery rates for financial firms have
been much lower at about 25% (see Mora (2012)). On the other hand, since bankruptcy state in
my model corresponds more closely to a systemic banking crisis rather than to a bankruptcy of an
individual bank, a higher recovery rate seems more applicable.
Reassuringly, qualitative features of the model remain stable for different values of parameters.
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6.2 Results
After setting the parameters as described in the previous section, I solved the model separately
for different values of bank endowment n, holding consumer’s endowment constant at 1. This exer-
cise provides comparative statics for different “sizes” of the banking sector in the economy.
Since the competitive equilibrium was proved to be efficient given the information frictions, the
model was solves as a social planner’s problem, assuming the equilibrium contract as given. I would
first solve the depositor’s problem for a given choice of r utilizing consumer’s first order condition.
The equilibrium condition on aggregate deposits being equal to individual choice is only imposed
after the FOC is specified. Having solved the model for a given value of r, I would then proceed to
finding a value of r which satisfied the zero-profit conditions. Since the equilibrium is efficient, this
is also the value which maximizes consumer’s welfare. I would then proceed to solving a model for
an alternative set of endowments. The summary of the results is presented in Figure 1.
As expected, terms of the equilibrium contract and consumer’s welfare increase with the value
of n. Also, the amount that consumers choose to deposit in banks increases with n, up until the point
when they find it optimal to allocate all their endowments in banks. After reaching this point (for
n= 0.0995 under my parametrization), the optimal allocation achieves the upper corner (d = 1) and
there is a visible “kink” in the solution to the model for values of n below and above this value. Let
us denote this value as n?. For n≥ n?, the allocation of resources in production is what I will further
call “full intermediation” - all investment in the economy is managed by bankers, and the expected
output is maximized.
For low values of n, corresponding to a small or undeveloped banking sector, the equilibrium
contracts have very “risky” features: high promised returns and high probability of bankruptcy. The
form of the contract makes it impossible for banks to pass on high realizations of R onto consumers.
Also, the amount of bank capital is insufficient to provide much of a cushion against unfavorable
realization of a shock. As a result, due to a large probability of bankruptcy, the actual expected
rate of return on deposits is actually low despite higher promised rates of return. As we compare
economies with successively higher values of bank equity, the contracts are becoming “safer” so that
the probability of bankruptcy falls, promised returns on deposits decrease, but the expected return on
deposits still increases. As contracts become more attractive, banks are able to attract more deposits.
This leads to a somewhat slower growth in the capital/asset ratio, nn+d as a function of n, since as n
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Figure 1: Equilibrium for different values of n
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increases, equilibrium value of d increases as well. Overall, I believe that the features just discussed
do resemble the most important features of banking sectors in developing economies.
As the amount of bank capital in the economy reaches the critical level n?, full intermediation
becomes possible and banks are able to offer contract attractive enough to convince consumers
to deposit all their endowments. Since productive technology has a higher expected return, this
allocation achieves maximum expected output possible in this economy. However, as n increases
above n?, terms of contracts offered to consumers improve further. The probability of bankruptcy
falls and the expected returns on deposits increase. This results from the fact that as n becomes larger,
banks are able to withstand more and more unfavorable output shocks without having to declare
bankruptcy and reducing the total amount of resources by bearing the bankruptcy costs. Since banks
are assumed to follow a competitive behavior, benefits of less bankruptcy in the economy are passed
on to consumers. Moreover, since after full intermediation has been achieved, the improvement in
terms of contracts is no longer slowed down by an inflow of new deposits, so the improvement in
the terms of contracts actually accelerates for values of n above n?. It is also worth noting that as
n becomes very large, then the probability of bankruptcy approaches zero and the promised (and
expected) rate of returned offered by banks approaches r = E[R]. This is the value and contract
terms that would have been offered were the banks not facing a non-negativity constraint - banks,
risk-neutral agents, would assume all the risk in the economy, and consumers, risk-averse agents
would be offered a completely certain outcome.
Finally, we should note that as I increase bankers endowment, depositors expected utility in-
creases as well. This finding is not particularly surprising as by increasing n and holding depositor’s
endowment constant, the overall amount of resources in the economy increases. In most models
featuring any kind of exchange this is expected to benefit both agents. This will be changed in the
next section.
7 Optimal amount of bank capital
Let us change the problem slightly. Instead of keeping consumer’s endowment constant and
increasing the endowment of the banker like in the previous section, suppose now that there is a unit
endowment in the economy as a whole. This unit can be distributed between banker and depositor
at the beginning of the period. After allocating the endowments, bankers and depositors are free
to sign contracts between them as in the previous section. Is there a possibility that moving some
resources away from consumer and giving them to a banker increases consumer’s welfare?
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This is an important question. In terms of the actual economy, it corresponds to a situation
when government may choose to tax depositors in order to inject capital into banks, a feature of
banking crises we often observe (see for example Laeven and Valencia (2013)). Note that in such
an environment, the government does not interfere with private contracts since it does not have the
ability to overcome information asymmetries present in the model, nor is there an externality that
needs to be corrected once endowments are allocated - once endowments are fixed, the competitive
equilibrium endowments is in fact efficient.
Formally, the planner’s problem is to choose to allocate the unit endowment in the economy
between bankers (n) and consumers (e), given the equilibrium price functions and allocations as
functions of the endowments. Since n+ e= 1, it is enough for the planner to pick only one of these
parameters. Let u? be the utility attained by consumers in a competitive equilibrium as a function of
endowments. Planner’s problem is given by:
Problem 7.1:
maxe,n u?(e,n)
subject to: e+n= 1
given e and n, (r, R˜,g(R)), d,and D are a CE as defined in Section 5
Note that this is a rather extreme version of planner’s problem, as all the Pareto weight is put on
the consumer. Still, we may wonder if it is desirable for the planner to allocate resources from con-
sumer to the banker. The tradeoff the planner faces is the following: decreasing e has a simple effect
of lowering the amount of resources at consumer’s disposal. On the other hand, though, it allows the
banker to offer better terms of the deposit contract, which then allows the consumer to participate in
the more productive technology operated by the banker. If the technology is sufficiently attractive,
then the loss from the lower total amount of resources at consumer’s disposal may be outweighed
by the gain from access to a more attractive contracts.
Again, to check if such a situation is possible, I turn to a numerical exercise, solving for a
competitive equilibrium for different distributions of endowment. As it turns out, for the parameters
used in section 6, the loss of consumer’s resources dominates the gain from better contracts. Note,
however, that for the parameters chosen in that section, the productive technology was not much
better than storage. After experimenting with different parameters of the productive technology,
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Table 2: Updated parameter values
Symbol Value Comments
σ 5 Risk aversion parameter
µ 0.8 Share of resources recovered from bankruptcy
Technology:
µR 0.12 Return distribution: log-normal
σR 0.05 Mean return: 1.129, Standard deviation 0.056
it turns out that shifting the distribution to the right by increasing the parameter µR, this tradeoff
changes significantly. The new values of parameters are presented in Table 2.
The only change in new parameters relative to old ones is the value of location parameter µR.
The solution to problem 7.1. for this set of parameters is shown on Figure 2.
For the values of parameters assumed above, a very interesting picture emerges. Overall, the
results are similar to those discussed in Section 6, with similar patterns for deposits, expected return
on bank deposits and probability of bankruptcy. Again, there exists a value of bank capital n? for
which consumers decide to deposit all their endowments with bankers. As n increases, the terms of
the contract offered to consumers also improve, with the promised and expected return approaching
the expected return on the productive technology.
However, the welfare implications are very different, with a very non-monotonic relationship
between the size of bank capital and consumer welfare. First, for values of n below n?, the negative
effect of decreasing the amount of resources available for consumer dominates the gain due to better
terms of contracts and consumer’s welfare is decreasing with n. The picture changes dramatically for
n≥ n?. After consumers have deposited all their endowments with bankers, additional bank capital
no longer serves to attract new deposits and is used only to offer better terms of contracts. Since
as in Section 6, this allows to further diminish bankruptcy risk, it increases consumer’s welfare.
In fact, the marginal gain in expected utility to consumer due to better terms of the contract now
outweighs the marginal loss due to lower endowment. This effect prevails until, at certain level
of n, denoted as n??, the marginal increases in utility due to better equilibrium contracts no longer
dominate. This happens because now the probability of bankruptcy is very small, and decreasing it
further is becoming more and more costly - in a way, there are certain negative economies of scale
in increasing n. Comparing the two local maxima, one at n = 0, and the other at n = n??, for this
set of parameters it turns out that consumer’s welfare is actually maximized for n = n??. Hence, a
planner given a possibility to allocate the endowments between consumer and banker will choose to
19
Figure 2: Equilibrium for different distributions of initial unit endowment
Dashed vertical line refers to the value of n that maximizes consumer’s utility
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give some of the endowment to the banker even if the planner cares only about the consumer. This
happens because allocating resources to banker helps the consumer to indirectly access the more
productive technology that only banker can operate.
Interestingly, note that in this environment, the minimal value of banker’s endowment for which
all the resources are intermediated and invested in the productive technology turns out to locally
minimize consumer’s welfare, which seems counter-intuitive as this is the lowest value of n which
achieves maximum expected output. However, due to information frictions in this economy, bankers
are not able to offer contracts that would allow consumers to take advantage of this efficiency in
overall production. Hence, if for some reason the economy started at this level of endowment,
it would be profitable for the planner to either decrease n, shrink the banking sector and free up
some resources to consumers, or shift resources from consumers to bankers, sacrificing some of the
resources on consumer’s side, but allow them to access far better contracts which would outweigh
the loss in endowment.
8 Conclusion
This paper provided a model of financial intermediation where bank capital plays a dual role:
it is directly used for investment, but it also allows banks to offer better contracts to depositors and
attract deposits. As a result, it allows for a more productive allocation of resources for production
in the economy. I have shown that benefits coming from a larger amount of bank capital may justify
taxing consumers to provide banks with more equity. The positive impact these better capitalized
banks have on the terms of the equilibrium contract may outweigh the loss associated with fewer
resources at consumer’s disposal.
Clearly, the model presented above is a highly stylized one and it cannot be used quantitatively.
First, it only features two periods. It would be more desirable to build an infinite horizon model
where the dynamic impact of shocks to output and policies such as bank recapitalization could be
analyzed. Note that the dynamic model could actually strengthen some results of the model. Namely,
after taxing consumers in order to recapitalize the banks, the new bank capital could be used for
several periods instead of just one. In a one period model, the bank capital is socially extremely
costly. In a multi-period model, one-off tax to inject capital to banks could prove desirable for far
less extreme assumptions on banks relative productivity.
Second, no space is given to banks portfolio decisions. After solving the contracting problem,
essentially no further role is given to banks. In particular, I assumed a fixed and stable distribution
of returns on bank’s assets. One could imagine a choice of technology, or the riskiness of investment
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by banks to be an additional feature of the model. However, this would significantly complicate the
contracting problem. Perhaps a more promising extension would be to allow for analyzing shocks to
output, or even potential changes to the distribution of output shock (lower mean, higher variance).
This could then allow for analysis of optimality and desirability of bank recapitalization in different
macroeconomic conditions.
Finally, when I analyzed the policy of reallocating the endowments, I did not consider potential
contracts between consumers and bankers that would allow for this reallocation to take place as
a part of decentralized equilibrium. Specifically, consumers in the model have no access to what
could be referred to as equity contracts. As I have shown in Section 7, if we allow for endowments
to be reallocated between agents, then for some parameter values the competitive equilibria are
constrained inefficient: we can redistribute resources to make both agents strictly better off. Whether
contracts that allow for such reallocation are feasible in this environment, how they look like and
what role they would play remains an interesting question for future research.
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Chapter 2
Bank Regulation and Financial Integration:
Imbalances in the Euro Area
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1 Introduction
Following the creation of the Euro area on January 1, 1999, the European economies fully in-
tegrated not only their currencies, but also their capital markets. After the integration, international
capital flows between the currency area countries reached unprecedented levels. This was reflected
by the current accounts balances in different Euro area countries, with several countries, most no-
tably Germany, noting current account surpluses, whereas many other countries, Spain being the
biggest, began to see current account deficits. As a whole, however, the current account balance
for the Euro area remained close to zero. The capital market integration was not accompanied by
unification of bank regulation. Regulation remained largely on a national level, with member states
still responsible for regulating banking activities in their countries. Also, most lending to firms has
still been conducted on a national level, with Spanish firms utilizing credit mostly from Spanish
banks, German firms from German banks etc. Thus, most of the international capital flows between
the Euro area countries went through interbank markets, throughout the whole period before the
global financial crisis. Over time, these surpluses and deficits built up to significant stocks of either
positive or negative foreign investment positions (IIP). In absolute terms, Germany, and specifically
the German banks became the largest net lender in the Euro area and Spain, and Spanish banks, the
largest net borrower.
These large flows from the European “North” to the European “South” have first been explained
as flows driven by simple differences in income, allowing poor countries to accelerate their process
of convergence process to the rich Euro area members (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002)). How-
ever, in the early 2000s some new patterns emerged: along with large capital flows and resulting
increase in capital stock and output, the productivity growth in borrowing countries became slug-
gish or even negative (Blanchard (2007)). This cast doubts on the hypothesis of simply using the
capital flows to finance the most productive investment in “peripheral” countries. Instead, it raised
questions about possible misallocation of resources in the capital inflow countries. However, if fi-
nancial sectors were so much less efficient in the deficit countries, then why would capital flow from
“efficient” uses in the surplus countries to the “inefficient” deficit countries? In this work, I suggest
the reason for the direction of the flows might have been differences in how tight the financial regu-
lation and bank lending was in different Euro area countries. Specifically, my hypothesis is that the
surplus countries had relatively strict limits on borrowing, understood as how tight their collateral
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constraints on firms were, and the deficit countries relatively lenient ones. In order to show how
these regulatory differences might have contributed to the capital flows in the Euro area, I focus
on the biggest lending and borrowing economies in the currency union, respectively Germany and
Spain.
In this chapter, I establish two facts. First, I bring evidence that the differences in regulations
were the reasons for differences in financial intermediation and in firm financing between the two
countries even before the creation of the currency union. Second, I show that these differences in
financial development help explain not only the patterns of capital flows and investment positions
between Germany and Spain, but also account for the observed behavior of macroeconomic variables
like the increase in capital stock and output in Spain without the corresponding increase in TFP.
In my analysis, I focus on credit financing, and more specifically on bank financing to firms.
The reason for this is that in both countries, bank lending has been by far the most importatnt fi-
nancing channel for non-financial corporations. In 2005, according to World Bank Global Financial
Development database, 32.6% of Spanish firms used banks to finance their investments and 35.8%
to finance working capital. For Germany, these numbers were even higher at 45.0% and 42.2%,
respectively. According to the same survey, 21.8% of all investments by firms in Spain was financed
by banks, with 22.6% in Germany. Equity financing played a relatively small role, used to finance
only 1.8% of investment in Spain and 9.3% in Germany. At the same time, the size of the corporate
bond market for non-financial firms remained small in both economies, with the stock of outstanding
corporate bonds not exceeding 5% of GDP in Germany and 2% in Spain, according to BIS data.
To prove the first point, I first look at the overall structure of bank credit to firms in Germany
and Spain before the creation of the Euro area. Despite lower level of output per capita, Spain has
gone through a period of financial development and deregulation in the 1990s. As a result, when
the Euro area was created, Spain has already had a higher level of credit to firms relative to GDP
than Germany despite the higher level of interest rates, both on the interbank market and on credit
to firms.
In order to analyze these phenomena, I build a two-country, general equilibrium model with
heterogeneous firms and households where firms face collateral constraints on the amount of capital
they can install. Each country is populated by a continuum of households and entrepreneurs, a
representative final goods producer, and a representative bank which acts as an intermediary on
the capital market. Entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods in a monopolistically competitive
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fashion. They are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and exit shocks, which generate a
need for capital reallocation between firms. Every time a firm gets hit by an exit shock, a new
firm enters in its place. Critically, each firm is constrained in how much capital it can install each
period, by a leverage constraint given as a multiple of firm’s net worth. Since firms face constant
exit probability, they cannot outgrow their way beyond the constraint. The model also features
heterogeneous workers as in Aiyagari (1994), facing idiosyncratic shocks to their labor endowments.
Workers are allowed to save in the bank, but are restricted from borrowing. As a result, workers’
precautionary saving gives rise to an upward-sloping capital supply curve in each economy. Final
goods producer combines intermediate goods from entrepreneurs and produces a final good which
is then used for consumption and investment and serves as the numeraire in the model. Finally, the
representative bank in each country gathers deposits from workers and entrepreneurs and lends to
entrepreneurs which want to install more capital than their current net worth. Bank borrowing and
lending happens inside each period after the realization of productivity shocks and is thus riskless.
I then analyze the steady-state of two closed economies, respectively calibrated to German and
Spanish data for 1998. Although there are some differences in firm dynamics between two coun-
tries, namely German firms have lower death rates, it turns out that to account for differences in
firm financing, it is necessary that the collateral constraint for Spanish firms be looser than for the
German ones, in line with German banks being more strictly regulated than the Spanish ones. The
model does well in matching other features of firm financing, including the difference in real inter-
est rates between the two countries, lower in Germany and higher in Spain, as well as differences in
capital/output ratios in the two.
I then conduct a quantitative exercize by allowing the banking sectors in the two countries to
lend and borrow from each other internationally, while keeping lending to firms at the national
level and subject to national collateral constraints. I then compute the steady state of this two-
country integrated world economy. The model generates international investment positions in the
two countries equal to about one third of these observed in the two countries within a few years after
the creation of the Euro area. It also predicts changes in capital, output, TFP and credit to firms in
line with those observed in the data. This suggests that the differences in regulation might be an
important factor when accounting for capital flows and international investment positions observed
in Europe in the early 2000s. Moreover, since the analysis is performed for a new steady state,
this suggests that a significant part of the imbalances seen between Germany and Spain are not a
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merely transitory phenomenon, but a permanent feature of a new international equilibrium when
two different financial sectors are integrated.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section discusses the related litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the data used and established the stylyzed facts I aim to explain. Section
4 presents the model. Section 5 deals with the calibration and the selection of parameters. Sec-
tion 6 presents the results, first for the closed-economy, before-integration setting, and then for the
integrated economies. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
This work relates to a few different strings in the literature. The issue of international financial
integration and capital flows has been analyzed by Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2009), who
looked at the impact of financial development on international investment positions between the
United States and the rest of the world using a two-country, general equlibrium model with financial
frictions. Another general equilibrium analysis of financial integration was develped by Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2006). Most other papers dealing with international financial integration focused on
econometric techniques, using statistical methods rather than general equilibrium model to assess
the overall economic impact of integrating capital markets - as an example, see Lane and Milesi-
Feretti (2003) or Bekaert et al. (2017). This paper extends this analysis by analyzing the impact
of financial regulation on capital market integration in the Euro area using a general equilibrium
setting.
The impact of financial frictions on firm dynamics has been extensively analyzed in the literature,
beginning with Banarjee and Duflo (2005) showing how credit constraints may give rise to capital
misallocation. The theme of capital misallocation has been further developed and measured by
Hsieh and Klenow (2009), who applied it to productivity discrepancy in China and India and by
Mendoza (2010), who looked at the impact of financial frictions on sudden stop episodes. Arellano
et al. (2012) focused more specifically on microeconomic implications of financial frictions on firm
dynamics. In a more recent papers, Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011), Moll (2014) and Midrigan and
Xu (2014) have linked the behavior of country’s TFP with its level of financial development.
Two interesting papers analyzing the impact of financial frictions on the behavior of macroeco-
nomic variables in context of China were Song et al. (2011) and Bai et al. (2018). Instead of different
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economies, they analyze the behavior of public and private sectors in the Chinese economy, subject
to different financial frictions and thus exhibiting different saving and capital allocation behavior.
In the context of Europe, Benigno and Fornaro (2014), and, specifically for Spain, Gopinath et
al. (2017) use a partial equilibrium setting to analyze the impact of a country gaining access to lower
interest rates from an external source and use it to explain the behavior of economies in Southern
Europe - Benigno and Fornaro by reallocation from tradeable to non-tradeable sector, Gopinath et al.
by a model with heterogeneous firms with size-varying leverage constraints. The paper by Gopinath
et al. actually uses a somewhat similar setting to mine, focusing on the role of firm heterogeneity
and financial frictions in the behavior of the Spanish economy after the creation of the Euro area.
Specifically, it aims to explain the slowdown in the growth rate of TFP in the early 2000s, and
the way to do this is to exploit the increase in variance in firm-level measured productivity after
the decline in the interest rates. This increase is led by the leverage constraint being tighter for
small (or low-net worth) firms than for large firms. As a result, small firms are slower to adjust
their capital stock to the new interest rate levels than the large firms, which leads to a temporary
increase in variance in measured firm-level productivity. Gopinath et al. thus focuses much more
closesly on the transisitonal dynamics and detailed firm-level observations. However, the analysis is
only conducted in a partial equilibrium setting, as the decrease in interest rates and capital inflows
are given exogenously. Thus, this work can be seen as filling the gap by implementing a similar
heterogeneous-firm framework into an international general equilibrium setting, and explaining both
the decrease in the interest rates, as well as the flows of capital to the Spanish economy.
3 Euro area: Germany and Spain
Euro area was created on January 1, 1999, first including 11 countries and the number growing
ever since. The euro was first introduced as an interbank currency, with banknotes and coins replac-
ing national currencies starting on January 1, 20014. Along with monetary integration and creation
of the European Central Bank came the integration of interbank credit markets: local currencies’
interbank interest rates have been replaced by a single interest rate spanning the whole currency
area. The convergence of nominal interest rates between countries is shown in Figure 3.
3.1 Growth accounting
After the creation of the Euro area, most European economies experienced a period of significant
4https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/history/emu/html/index.en.html
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Figure 3: Nominal Interest Rates in Germany, Spain and the Euro Area
Source: ECB, Deutsche Bundesbank, Banco de Espana
economic growth in the early 2000s. This was also the case for Germany and Spain, both in absolute
as well as in per working age person terms. However, the two economies behaved quite differently
in terms of the composition of growth, in particular their TFP growth. I decompose the output per
working age person following Kehoe (2002), using the same parameter values I use later for the
model: capital share α equal 0.35 and depreciation rate δ = 0.08, both standard in the literature.
According to the paper, for an economy on a balanced growth path the output should grow at the
same rate as measured TFP raised to the power 11−α , A
1
1−α
t , which is the TFP series plotted on Figure
4. As shown in Figure 4, after the creation of the Euro area, Germany has been close to the balanced
growth path, with both variables remaining relatively close together after the period in the 1990s
when TFP grew faster than output.
However, as shown in Figure 4, this was not the case for Spain. Even though GDP per working
age person has increased significantly, the TFP has actually been decreasing over the 2000-2008
period. In terms of growth decomposition, output growth over this period was mostly driven by an
increase in working hours per working age person, mostly due to large immigration, and to a lesser
extent by capital accumulation. A large part of the decline in productivity has been accredited, most
importantly by Gopinath et al. (2017), to an inflow of capital after the decrease in the real interest
rates and a resulting increase in dispersion of productivity between firms in the manufacturing sector.
29
Figure 4: Output and TFP in Germany and Spain, 1990=100
Source: OECD, Eurostat. Output is in real, per-working-person terms. TFP is taken to power 11−α for consistecy with
balanced growth path.
Figure 5: IMF Financial Development Index
Source: Svirydzenka (2016)
3.2 Financial development and regulation
Defining the stringency of bank regulation is a multidimensional problem, and is usually done
through multiple indicators (e.g. Barth et al. (2013)). Another, simple index that summarizes the
level of financial development has been constructed in the IMF by Svirydzenka (2016). This Fi-
nancial Development Index uses a number of indicators including credit/GDP, assets of different
financial institutions like insurance companies and mutual funds, some parameters of the stock mar-
ket, as well as the number of indicators on the banking system, like interest margins, lending/deposit
spreads, or returns on investment and equity. The index describes the overall level of financial
development, and comprises of two subindices for financial institutions and financial markets, re-
spectively. The behavior of the Financial Development Index and the Financial Institutions Index in
Spain and Germany are shown on Figure 5.
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Figure 6: Bank lending to non-financial firms, share of GDP
Source: ECB, Deutsche Bundesbank, Banco de Espana
According to both the overall and to the institutions index, Spain has gone through a period of
fast development of its financial sector in the late 1990s, to the point of having more developed
financial institutions than Germany. According to the IMF index, Spain’s average level of financial
development at the moment of creation of the euro was actually higher not only than Germany’s,
but also higher than the average for the original 12 Euro area member countries, despite Spain still
having lower GDP per capita at the time.
Another, simple and commonly used measure of bank development or is the size of the stock
of credit to firms as a share of output. This has shown some interesting dynamics throughout the
analyzed period. The numbers for bank credit/GDP are shown in Figure 6. Interestingly, Spain
featured higher amount of firm credit/GDP than Germany even before the international flows began
and despite higher interest rates, with the stock equal to 39.8% of GDP at the beginning of 1999,
compared to only 33.8% in Germany at the same time. However, after the creation of the Euro area,
the stock of bank lending in Spain grew significantly relative to the size of the economy, with an
actual decline in Germany.
At the same time, the size of the corporate bond market for non-financial firms remained small
in both economies: The nominal stock of outstanding bonds issued by non-financial corporations
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was only equal to around 4-5% of GDP in Germany and 1-2% in Spain throughout the whole ana-
lyzed period, according to the BIS data. Hence, we are not losing much by ommitting the numbers
for corporate bonds. As a robustness check, I ran the analysis with the credit numbers including
corporate bonds and the results were almost entirely unchanged.
One could ask a quesition about the reasons of the relatively low financial development in Ger-
many. Although neither the index, not the numbers on lending to firms do not explain the sources of
it, it seems plausible that this lower level in Germany is not due to the worse contract enforcement or
legal system. One interesting explanation could be a different structure of firm distributions in two
countries, with German firms being possibly longer-lived, more stable and thus more likely to rely
on self-financing rather than on bank credit. Although there is some evidence for this being true,
with death rates of firms in Germany around 1 percentage point higher than in Spain (on average,
around 8% against 9% in Spain), they do not suffice to quantitatively explain the different patterns
in lending. In the rest of the chapter, I assume that aside from the differences in the firm distribution,
it was stricter regulation and possibly more conservative lending practices of German banks that led
to a lower volume of lending to firms even before the creation of the Euro area and were the main
factor that accounted for the capital flows observed after financial integration.
3.3 International investment position
The increase in credit to firms by Spanish banks was to a large extent financed by Spanish banks
borrowing on the international bank debt markets. Although deposits in the banking sector have
grown, the loan/deposit ratio in the banking sector as a whole has increased from 0.91 at the end of
1998 to 1.09 at the end of 2006, according to the Bank of Spain data. The increase being financed
by international borrowing is suggested by numbers on international investment position as a share
of output shown on Figure 7. Before the creation of the Euro area, the Spanish financial sector was
actually a net lender against the rest of the world. However, after the financial integration, Spanish
banks began borrowing on a large scale on the international markets. This led to a deterioration of
Spanish financial institutions’ IIP to -32.6% of GDP by the end of 2016. It is also worth noting that
borrowing by banks happened on a much larger scale than by other sectors, including household and
non-financial firms.
The deterioration in Spanish banks’ international investment position was almost mirrored by an
improvement in IIP of German financial intermediaries. From being a slight negative borrower at
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Figure 7: International Financial Position by Sector, share of GDP
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Banco de Espana, Eurostat
Euro area’s creation, German banks became a large net lender, as their IIP improved from -5.8% of
GDP to +17.1% of GDP at the end of 2006. Again, in terms of the size of the movement, changes in
banks’ positions were the largest among different sectors in the economy. Interestingly, the absolute
sizes of Germany and Spanish banks’ IIPs were quite similar, with the German net saving standing
at 420 bil. euros and Spanish net borrowing at 318 bil. euros at the end of 2006.
3.4 Summary - stylized facts
To summarize my empirical findings, a few stylized facts can be established following the mon-
etary and financial integration following the creation of the Euro:
1. Both Germany and Spain experienced economic growth, but in case of Spain the growth in
output happened without a corresponding growth in productivity.
2. Spain had relatively well developed financial markets intermediation sector relative to Ger-
many at the creation of the Euro area. Following the integration, the amount of bank lending
to firms in Spain increased significantly, without a corresponding growth in Germany.
3. Large part of the increase in lending by Spanish banks was financed by borrowing on the
international debt markets, as shown by the IIP data. At the same time, German banks became
net lenders on these same markets.
In the next section, I develop a model used to account for these facts.
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4 Model
Time is discrete. There are two countries, i ∈ {1,2}. In each economy, there are two kinds
of heterogeneous agents, workers and entrepreneurs (intermediate good producers), with measure
one per country of each, as well as a representative bank and a representative final goods producer.
Workers inelastically supply work to the labor market, earn wages, and are subject to idiosyncratic,
random shocks to their labor endowments as in Ayiagari (1994). In order to insure from the in-
come risk, the workers can save in the banks, but are restricted from borrowing. Entrepreneurs run
monopolistically competitive firms, employ capital and labor, are also to save or borrow from the
representative bank and are subject to exit shocks and idiosyncratic shocks to productivity. The exit
shock can be interpreted as receiving an irreversible shock setting their productivity indefinitely to
zero, but is otherwise uncorrelated with productivity shocks, and the exit probability is identical for
all level of productivity. Every time an entrepreneur receives a death shock, a new entrepreneur pro-
ducing the same variety of the intermediate good enters the model with a given amount of net worth
endowment to replace her. Since there is no free entry condition, this allows to keep the measure of
entrepreneurs constant. At the same time, monopolistic competition and the risk of a death shock
prevent entrepreneurs from growing indefinitely. Workers and entrepreneurs have the same discount
factors and the same time-separable CRRA utility function of consumption. Due to the existence of
idiosyncratic shocks, entrepreneurs and workers have an incentive to trade their assets on the credit
market - for precautionary reasons, and in case of entrepreneurs to faster achieve the optimal capital
stock. Borrowing by entrepreneurs, however, is subject to a collateral constraint, which limits the
amount each entrepreneur can borrow to a certain multiple of entrepreneur’s net worth. The tight-
ness of the constraint can be interpreted as the strictness of bank regulation on credit. Analysis is
confined to the steady state in each economy before integration and to the steady state of integrated
economies. Before the integration, each economy can be considered as a closed one and can be
analyzed separately.
4.1 Intermediate good producers
In economy i, there is a continuum of intermediate good producers of measure one. They are
monopolistically competitive, with each entrepreneur producing their own variety of an intermediate
good. The entrepreneur’s state is given by their productivity z and by their net worth a. Productivity
has two components, a permanent zP and a temporary one zT . Each period, entrepreneur hires labor
and capital for production, which generates profits pi , and they might deposit some of their net worth
in a bank at the interest rate r. In order to simplify the analysis, I adopt the assumption used, among
others, by Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) or by Moll (2014), that exogenous shocks to productivity
are known to the entrepreneurs when they makes their decisions about hiring capital and labor. The
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choice of capital is subject to a collateral constraint, which may vary between different economies.
After production and payment to workers and capital owners, the entrepreneur chooses between
consumption and assets (net worth) she allocates for the next period. Moreover, at the beginning
of each period, the entrepreneur also faces a risk of a death shock, coming with probability ζ . If
the entrepreneur receives this shock, she receives utility value U(a) equal to the utility of a constant
stream of consumption with present value equal to her net worth. Finally, after opening of the
international lending and borrowing market, I assume the intermediate goods are non-tradable. Since
intermediate good producers all face identical problems and the measure of them is constant over
time, I drop the subscripts denoting the particular variety the firm produces.
Entrepreneur’s Bellman equation is given by:
V (a,z) = ζU(a)+(1−ζ ){max
c,k,l,a′
u(c)+βEz′V (a′,z′)}
subject to:
c+a′ = pi(k, l,a,z)+(1+ r)a
where U(a) is the utility the entrerpreneur obtains if she receives a death shock, and pi is the profit
earned by entrepreneur’s firm.
4.1.1 Intra-period problem
Within the period, conditional on not receiving the death shock and after learning about the
value of her temporary productivity component, the entrepreneur hires capital k and labor l in order
to maximize profits. The price of labor is wage, denoted as w. The rental price for capital is equal
to the interest rate r. Moreover, during production, capital depreciates at rate δ . Since entrepreneurs
are monopolistically competitive, they also choose the price of their intermediate goods’ variety p,
subject to their demand function. The demand function for a variety comes from the solution of the
final good producer’s problem (see below), and is known to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s
problem within the period is given by:
pi = max
{y,k,l,p}
{py−wl− (r+δ )k}
subject to the production function (PF), the demand function (DF), and the collateral constraint
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(CC):
(PF) y = z f (k, l)
(DF) y =
Y
P
·
(
p
P
)−γ
(CC) k ≤ k¯(a,λ ,w,r)
Firms are monopolistically competitive as in Dixit-Stiglitz model, with the elasticity of demand
equal to γ . Y =
[´
y(i)
γ−1
γ di
] γ
γ−1
is the aggregate output in the economy, and P=
[´
p(i)1−γdi
] 1
1−γ
is the aggregate price level. Both are implied by the aggregate state of the economy, and are constant
in the steady state, but will differ between economies and before and after financial integration.
This leads to a standard markup pricing, where the price is a markup over firm’s marginal cost,
p = γγ−1MC. However, the collateral constraint limits the amount of capital entrepreneurs can hire
within the period and prevents them from attaining socially optimal allocations. The constraint is
obtained as follows: for any borrowing, which is defined as the excess of capital installed over firm’s
own assets, k−a, the amount that the entrepreneur has to repay on her loan is limited to a multiple
of firm’s net worth:
(1+ r+δ )(k−a)≤ λa
This leads to a constraint on the amount of capital the firm can install being a multiple of firm’s
assets:
k
a
≤ 1+ r+δ +λ
1+ r+δ
with λ ≥ 0, where λ = 0 corresponds to a complete shutdown of capital rental market and λ →+∞
corresponds to perfect capital markets.
Note that with this form of the constraint, the amount of capital the firm can hire depends not
only on the value of collateral parameter λ , but also on the level of interest rates in the economy,
with interest faced by the firm equal to r+δ . Thus, even for two economies with identical λ ’s, the
maximum leverage used by firms might differ if economies for some reason exhibit different interest
rates, constraints being looser if interest rates are low.
Finally, the temporary component of productivity zT , evolves according to an AR(1) process in
logarithms with autocorrelation parameter ρz and a normally distributed error term with zero mean
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and standard deviation σz.
logzT,t+1 = (1−ρ)z¯T +ρz logzT,t + εzt
4.1.2 Exit and entry
If the firm receives the death shock, it receives utility U(a), where U is the utility of a constant
stream of consumption with present value equal to a, i.e. equal to the utility from a constant stream
of consumption equal to ar . This utility is given by:
U(a) =
1
(1−β )u
(a
r
)
For every firm that receives the death shock, a new firm producing the same variety is born.
The new entrant receives an initial endowment of assets a0, and a level of productivity z, given
by the product of a draw from the permanent productivity distribution F(zP) and a draw from the
invariant distribution of temporary productivity distribution G(zT ). This ensures that the distribution
of productivity parameters in the economy remains constant over time and essentially turns off the
aggregate risk. After birth, the firm immediately enters the labor and capital rental markets. Hence,
the measure of firms in the economy remains constant over time.
4.2 Final good producer
The economy features a representative, competitive final good producer. The producer takes the
varieties produced by intermediate goods producers and combines them into a final consumption
good using a CES production function:
Y =
[ˆ 1
0
y(i)
γ−1
γ di
] γ
γ−1
where γ is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties. The price of the final good is
normalized to one. Final good producer solves the problem of minimizing costs of production of a
given amount of the final good:
min
y(i)
ˆ 1
0
y(i)p(i)di
subject to the output of the final good being Y =
[´ 1
0 y(i)
γ−1
γ di
] γ
γ−1
. This specification of the prob-
lem gives rise to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) algebra for the demand functions for individual
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varieties, with the demand function for individual variety given by:
y(i) =
Y
P
·
(
p(i)
P
)−γ
where P=
[´
p(i)1−γdi
] 1
1−γ
is the aggregate price level.
However, due to idiosyncratic shocks received by the intermediate goods producers and due
to imperfect financial markets in the economy, the joint distribution of assets and productivity can
only be obtained numerically. As a result, the aggregate output in the economy, Y , can also only
be calculated through numerical methods. Y is used as the measure of GDP in the economy. For
economies with different parameters, and because the final good is the numeraire, the price index
for the intermediate goods P might also differ between countries.
It is important to note that the final good is the numeraire in the model. It is also the good in
which lending and borrowing take place, and once the two economies integrate, it is also the good
which is traded between countries.
4.3 Workers
Workers are infinitely lived and similar to the households described by Ayiagari (1994). Each
period, workers receive a stochastic endowment of labor, l, which they then supply inelastically
to the labor market which pays wage w per unit of labor. In addition, workers can also save, but
not borrow, their assets n in banks. The banks pay a rental rate r. Labor endowment evolves
stochastically following an AR(1) process in logs:
log lt+1 = (1−ρ)l¯+ρl log lt + ε lt
The mean of the labor endowment is normalized to ensure the aggregate labor supply equals one
in every period.
Worker’s Bellman equation is given by:
W (n, l;w,r) = max
c,n′
{u(c)+βEl′V (n′, l′;w′,r′)}
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subject to:
(1+ r)n+wl = c+n′
n′ ≥ 0
Hence, given prices and the stochastic process for labor endowments, there exists a steady-state
joint distribution of households over their net worth and labor endowments. Since workers’ net worth
is constrained to be positive, they will be net supplier of savings to the banking sector. Moreover,
since the primary role of workers’ savings in the model is precautionary saving, the supply curve of
capital by households is going to be an upward-sloping function of the interest rate r, and is going
to be non-degenerate and positive for different values of r.
4.4 Banks
Banks act as intermediaries on the capital market. Each period, they collect deposits from do-
mestic households and firms, and grant loans to domestic firms. Banks are assumed to be compet-
itive, and make zero profits. Thus, the interest rate on deposits is equal to r, and the interest rate
on loans equals r+ δ , since banks have to be compensated for the depreciation of capital lent to
the entrepreneurs. The balance sheet of the representative bank in country i in the closed economy
version of the model is given by:
ˆ
ndΓi(n, ls)+
ˆ
1a≥k(a− k)dΦi(a,z) =
ˆ
1k>a(k−a)dΦi(a,z)
The left hand side is the sum of deposits by households and by firms, and the right hand side is
total bank lending to firms - note that the firm is considered a depositor if its net worth is higher than
the capital stock it installs, i.e. k < a, and a borrower if the opposite is true, i.e. k > a.
After the financial integration, I assume that banks in different countries can also lend and borrow
from each other. However, the deposits and loans to entrepreneurs are still kept on a national level
and are subject to local collateral constraints. This mimics the patterns of financial integration
following the creation of the euro, with widespread interbank lending, but without much cross-
border loans or deposits between firms, households and banks. Since banks are competitive in
each country, interest rates are still going to be equalized between the two countries, even though
firms and households in each cannot directly access banks abroad. Let the lending made by the
representative bank in country i to banks abroad be denoted as IIPi - it is going to correspond to
39
banking sector’s net international investment position. Following the integration, the balance sheet
of the representative bank in country i becomes:
ˆ
ndΓi(n, ls)+
ˆ
1a≥k(a− k)dΦi(a,z) =
ˆ
1k>a(k−a)dΦi(a,z)+ IIPi
Finally, the sum of international borrowing and lending must equal zero:
∑
i
IIPi = 0
That is, for a two-country model, first country’s banks’ borrowing must be second country’s
banks’ lending.
4.5 Equilibrium in a closed economy
We can now bring all the elements together and define the competitive equilibrium in a closed
economy.
Definition: Intermediate goods’ producer’s individual state is given by s(i) = (a(i),z(i)). Indi-
vidual household’s state is given by t( j) = (n( j), ls( j)). Aggregate state S is given by distributions
of firmsΦ(a,z) and households Γ(n, ls). Stationary competitive equilibrium in this economy is given
by:
• prices (r,w, p( j)1i=0)
• agents’ value functions (V (S,s),W (S, t)) and policy functions for firms
(d(S,s),a′(S,s),k(S,s), l(S,s)) and households (c(S, t),n′(S, t))
• distribution of agents over states Φ(a,z) - for entrepreneurs, and Γ(n, ls) - for workers
such that:
1. Given her individual state, prices and the law of motion of aggregate state, value and policy
functions of each worker solve the worker’s problem
2. Given her individual state, prices (r,w), her demand function and the law of motion of aggre-
gate state, value and policy functions of each entrepreneurs solve the entrepreneur’s problem
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3. Given prices, the final good producer solves her cost minimization problem
4. Labor market clears and banking sector’s balance sheet equation holds:
ˆ
(l(a,z)dΦ(a,z) =
ˆ
lsdΓ(n, ls)ˆ
ndΓi(n, ls)+
ˆ
1a≥k(a− k)dΦi(a,z) =
ˆ
1k>a(k−a)dΦi(a,z)
5. Aggregate state given by the distribution of firms and households evolves according to:
Φ(a′,z′) = F(Φ(a,z))
Γ(n′, l′s) = G(Γ(n, ls))
6. Economy remains in the stationary equilibrium:
F(Φ(a,z)) = Φ(a,z)
G(Γ(n, ls)) = Γ(n, ls)
Note that on the capital market, the firms are the only ones on the demand side since there is no
borrowing by households. However, on the capital supply side, some of the capital consists of capital
supplied by firms and some of capital supplied by households. The sum of differences between
capital installed by firms and these firms’ assets is then used as a measure of the amount of credit
in the economy. This includes two components: savings by households, as well as assets being
reallocated between firms - for example, between firms which received an unfavorable productivity
shock to ones who received a good one.
4.6 Economic integration
I define the economic or financial integration as two economies beginning to share one, common
capital market. Since there is no aggregate risk, this implies that the price of capital on the rental
market is now the same everywhere and equals r. Moreover, individual firms are still subject to the
same death rates and collateral constraints - this is equivalent to firms still being subject to local
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regulations and borrowing from their domestic banking sectors. Labor markets and markets for
individual varieties of intermediate goods also remain closed. The second decision shuts down the
complications related to an increase in the number of available varieties in each country.
I allow for two integrating economies to be different in size - let the size of one economy be
given by N1, and the other by N2. The relative size of both economies only plays a role in the market
clearing condition, but does not affect the number of intermediate good varieties produced in each
economy - this is set equal to one in each.
Overall, there are three parameters that can be different in the two economies:
• Average productivity of intermediate goods’ producers
• Death rate of firms
• Collateral constraint parameters
Also, each economy remains with a separate distribution of intermediate goods prices pi( j)i∈{1,2}
and wages wi. The equilibrium definition in the (integrated) global economy remains very similar
to two separate economies, except there is not only one interest rate r, which comes from a mar-
ket clearing condition common for both countries. This can be summarized by the balance sheet
equaltion for the representative bank in country i:
ˆ
ndΓi(n, ls)+
ˆ
1a≥k(a− k)dΦi(a,z) =
ˆ
1k>a(k−a)dΦi(a,z)+ IIPi
with the additional condition that the international investment position of the integrated two-
country economy equals zero:
∑
i
Ni · IIPi = 0
Since international borrowing and lending is the only part where the relative size of the two
countries matters, this is the only equaltion where these relative sizes enter.
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5 Calibration
In the next step, the model is calibrated to match the relevant moments in the data. One period
in the model is set to equal one year in the data. Table 1 shows the values of these parameters of
the model. For specific funcional forms, I choose the standard CRRA utility with risk aversion pa-
rameter σ and discount factor β , both identical for both households and entrepreneurs. Production
function of intermediate good producers is Cobb-Douglas with capital share parameter α . Elasticity
of demand for individual varieties produced by intermediate good producers is given by γ . Param-
eters (α,β ,δ ,σ ,γ) are assumed to take values standard in the literature. Finally, initial entrants are
assumed to start with assets equal a0 = 0.1.
For the firm’s productivity processes, I assume the permanent component to be distributed Pareto
with the tail parameter η equal 3. Due to monopolistic competition and indivual firms thus behaving
as if they faced decreasing returns to scale, this translates to employment distribution being (in the
undistorted case) close to one observed empirically, with tails significantly thicker than those implied
by the distribution of permanent productivity components. The transitory component is assumed to
follow an AR(1) process in logs, with parameters ρz and σz identical to those estimated by Gopinath
et al. (2017).
Household’s labor endowment follows an AR(1) process in logs, with corrleation coefficient ρl
standard deviation σl . Parameters for the household process have been set at ρl = 0.9 and σl = 0.2,
consistent with Guvenen (2009). Standard deviation is set to generate the ratio between the 90th and
the 10th percentile of labor income of around 3.5, similar to one observed in the data for Germany
and Spain in the period. The mean of the labor endowment process is adjusted to equal one in
original metric - this sets aggregate labor supply equal to one in each economy.
There are three parameters in the model that I allow to be country-specific: firm death rate ζ , av-
erage firm productivity z¯, and the collateral constraint λ . Of these, I take the death rate straight from
the data reported by Eurostat, with ζ=0.08 in Germany and ζ = 0.09 in Spain. For productivity and
collateral paremters, I have to solve the model in order to compute the targeted moments. These mo-
ments are the volume of firm credit relative to output and the relative ratio of wages in two countries,
both targeted at their 1998 levels. The values of country-specific parameters are shown in Table 2.
The values of the moments targeted by these parameters are shown in Table 3. Overall, it appears
that after calibration, the model captures the financing patterns of both economies reasonably well.
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Table 3: Calibration : Parameter values
Var Value Description Comments
σ 2.0 Risk aversion
β 0.95 Time preference
α 0.35 Capital share
δ 0.08 Depreciation rate
γ 3.0 Demand elasticity for monopolistically
competitive producers
a0 0.1 Entrant’s initial assets Scaled by country’s productivity
η 3.0 Tail parameter of the distribution
of permanent component of z
ρz 0.6 Persistance of temp. productivity Gopinath et al. (2017)
σz 0.1 Std. dev. of temp. productivity Gopinath et al. (2017)
ρl 0.9 Persistance of labor endowment
σl 0.2 Std. dev. of labor endowment 90/10 labor income ratio of 3.5
Table 4: Country-specific parameters
Value
Parameter DE ES Description
z¯ 1.60 1.00 Average firm productivity
λ 0.68 1.19 Collateral constraint
ζ 0.08 0.09 Death rate of firms
Taking the country-specific parameters jointly, we might characterize the two economies in the
following way: Germany has a more stable corporate sector, as indicated by a lower death rate of
firms. The firms are also significantly more productive. At the same time, the bank lending standards
in Germany are far more restrictive than in Spain, likely due to tighter regulation. Together, the
tighter collateral constraint and lower death probability mean that firms in Germany rely on self-
financing more than firms in Spain - they have less ability to leverage up significantly, but there is
also less need to reallocate capital from exiting to entering firms, simply because Germany has fewer
of both.
Table 5: Targeted moments
Model Data (1998)
Moment DE ES DE ES
Avg real wage ratio 1.28 1.28
Firm credit, % of GDP 34.7 39.5 33.8 39.8
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Table 6: Non-targeted moments - before integration
Model Data (1998)
Moment Germany Spain Germany Spain
Real interest rates 2.0% 2.5% 1.8% 2.5%
Relative K/Y ratio 1.19 1.13
6 Results
6.1 Pre-integration
To check the validity of the model and the chosen parameters, I first I calculate some additional,
untargeted moments generated by the model for the two economies before the financial integration.
The results for two untargeted moments are presented in Table 4. Overall, the model does well
in terms of matching the moments that characterize the credit markets and the aggregate amount of
capital used in both economies. For the interest rates, the really crucial part is the difference between
rates in the two countries rather than the absolute level, since the latter is generally determined by
the choice of the discount rate β . As it is assumed to be identical between the two economies, the
difference between the real interest rates in the two economies is determined by country-specific
parameters, most importantly collateral constraints. In addition to matching the targeted size of
credit to GDP, the model successfully replicates the non-targeted difference in real interest rates
between Germany and Spain - the model generates a difference of 0.56 percentage points, versus
0.70 percentage points in 1998 observed in the data. This suggests the validity of the chosen form
of financial constraints differing between the two countries.
Tighter collateral constraints and lower firm death rates in Germany also result in German firms
accumulating more capital relative to their output. I compare the relative capital/output ratios in two
countries. Admittedly, the model does not replicate the absolute values of capital/output stocks in
both economies - most likely due to its focus on the corporate sector and not modelling the housing
sector, or other forms of capital. Still, according to the model, German firms’ capital/output ratio is
about 19% higher than in Spain. This actually overstates the actual difference measured in the data,
where estimated capital/output ratio in 1998 in Germany has been about 13% higher than in Spain.
6.2 After integration
After calibrating and solving the model for two economies separately, I then solve the model for
an integrated equilibrium described in Section 4.5. To match the relative size of the two economies
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Table 7: Post-integration
Model Data (2006)
Moment DE ES DE ES
Banks IIP, % of GDP +4.1% -9.2% +12.2% -30.7%
% change in K/Y ratio -0.3% +0.6% -3.4% +4.6%
% change in capital stock -0.3% +0.9%
% change in output -0.1% +0.3%
% change in measured TFP 0.0% -0.1%
I set Germany’s size to be twice that of Spain’s, in line with their working-age populations in
late 1990s. After integration, the new steady state features interest rate slightly lower than the
population-weighted average of the two closed economies, with the new real interest rate equal to
2.14%. The moments in the integrated, two-country general equilibrium are presented in Table 5.
The model generates about one third of the changes in international financial positions observed
over the period of 1998-2006. Germany becomes a net lender and Spain becomes a net borrower. In
sectoral terms, this result is mostly driven by changes in savings by households, which significantly
decline in Spain in reaction to lower interest rates and correspondingly increase in Germany. Firms’
net worth in both countries does not change significantly, actually with a small increase in Spain and
a small decrease in Germany. The model also generates part of the increase in capital/output ratio
observed in Spain through the analyzed period.
On other variables, the impact is relatively small, but it matches all the qualitative characteristics
of the phenomena observed after the creation of the Euro area. Capital stock increases in Spain and
decreases in Germany, Spain observes an increase in output of about 0.6%, with the measured TFP
actually decreasing. This happens since due to lower steady state interest rates, firms accumulate
more capital which in the absence of changes in the production technology translates to a lower
measured productivity on the economy level. Still, an increase in output due to capital accumulation
more than outweighs the negative change in TFP.
While the results on chagnes in output and measured TFP might appear small, it is important
to remember that the analysis here addresses the steady state, and not the transition dynamics. As
suggested by Gopinath et al. (2017), most of the decline in the measured TFP in Spain after the
creation of the Euro area was due to transition dynamics and smaller firms taking longer to adjust to
a new equilibrium. My analysis suggests that even this effect aside, the TFP in Spain is likely to be
lower in the long-run after the economic integration relative to its closed-economy counterfactual.
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Moreover, following the integration I keep the collateral constraints constant in the two countries. As
a result, credit to firms moves in directions observed by the data, but it does not change significantly.
If it the collateral constraints were allowed to change to match the actual volume of lending observed
in the data, the impact on other variables would have been significantly higher.
Moreover, the results of the model suggest that a relatively large part of significant net inter-
national investment position stocks following the integration are not a transitory phenomenon but
rather a part of new long-run equlibrium. In the two-country equilibrium, the capital accumulated
by households is then lent by banks in highly regulated economies to banks in low-regulated ones,
and then lent to firms in those economies to firms. This leads to changes in capital stock, output and
productivity going in same directions as those observed in the data.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this work is to help explain the impact the different financial sector regulations in the
Euro area economies had on the patterns of financial flows, credit to firms and other macroeconomic
variables. The first contribution is providing evidence of relatively lower degree of regulation and
conservatism of banks in deficit countries, most notably Spain, relative to those in surplus countries
like Germany. These differences in regulations can account for the differences between the firm
financing patterns observed in the data before the creation of the Euro area and integration of capital
markets. Second, I show that these differences in regulation help explain the observed patterns in
international capital flows, with Germany becoming a surplus country and Spain becoming a deficit
one, also accounting for the patterns observed in their output, capital stocks and TFP. My results
suggest that as long as regulatory differences exist, the significant absolute international financial
positions between Euro area countries are likely to persist.
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Appendix
This appendix includes proofs related to the features of the optimal contract described in Chapter
1.
Lemma: Any solution S?,g?(R),C? to Problem 3.1. has the property that S? = {R : R< R˜} for
some R˜.
Proof: For this part, it will be easier to deal with a dual problem of maximizing banker’s ex-
pected payoff subject to a given depositor’s utility level. By duality, the two problems are equivalent.
The dual problem is given by:
Problem A.1:
max
S,g(R),C
{ˆ
S
{µR−g(R)}dF(R)+
ˆ
S′
{R−C}dF(R)
}
subject to:
ˆ
S
u(s+g(R))dF(R)+
ˆ
S′
u(s+C)dF(R)≥ K (depositor’s utility)
µR−g(R)> R−C∀R ∈ S (incentive compatibility)
C > 0,C ≤ R∀R ∈ S′,0≤ g(R)≤ µR∀R ∈ S (nonnegativity)
The proof follows by contradiction. I show that there exists an alternative contracts which deliv-
ers the same utility to the depositor but strictly increases payoffs to the banker. Roughly speaking,
for any verification region of R that has a non-verification region to its left (i.e. verification for lower
values of R), I can shift the verification region to the left and keep the distribution of payments to
depositor the same as before. By saving on bankruptcy costs, which are strictly increasing in R, I
thus make the banker strictly better off.
Formally, suppose that in the solution to the problem A.1 there exists an interval B= (R3,R4) for
which verification takes place. Let piB =
´
B dF(R) be the probability that R falls into this interval. To
obtain a contradiction, take an interval A= (R1,R2) such that A features no verification, R1 < R2 <
R3 < R3 and piA = piB. Interval A is thus to the left of B. I will show that shifting the bankruptcy
region from B to A while holding the distribution of payoffs for the depositor constant leads to
strictly higher expected profit for the banker due to lower verification costs. The alternative contract
has the following form: on B, we keep the constant payment to the depositor equal to C. On A, we
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will construct payment to the depositor of gˆ(R) which has the same distribution on A as the payment
specified in the previous contract g(R) had on B. Since piA = piB, this leads to the situation when
depositor’s consumption, seen as a random variable in itself, has the exact same distribution as under
the previous contract. Namely, we will construct gˆ(R) to be gˆ(R)≡ Xˆ with:
Prob(Xˆ ≤ x|R ∈ A) = Prob(X ≤ x|R ∈ B)∀c ∈ ( inf
R∈B
g(R),sup
R∈B
g(R))
More intuitively, for any level of consumption specified on B by g(R), we associate the same
level of consumption on A with the same probability. We can then repeat the process for all other
values taken by g(R) on B. Since the only source of variation in consumer’s consumption is due
to the possible verification in the contract, this leads to a situation when consumption under the
new contract, seen as a random variable, has the exact same cumulative distribution function as
before, the only difference being that it now takes different values for realizations of R that lie
within intervals A and B. As regards feasibility, since g(R) was feasible on B, then by incentive
compatibility g(R)<C. SinceC was feasible on A as there was no verification in that interval under
the previous contract, and gˆ(R) by construction takes the same values as g(R) did, we have that is
feasible on A. Similarly, since paying C to depositor was feasible on A, it is also feasible on B since
B includes larger values of R than A. By the same token, since C was feasible on A, it is also clearly
incentive compatible for the banker on B, as there are more resources available for every R ∈ B as
compared to values of R on A.
I’ve shown that the new contract is feasible, incentive compatible for the banker and that the
consumer is indifferent between the two contract. It remains to show that it delivers strictly larger
payment to the banker. Since payments on sets other than A and B are identical under both plans,
we will only consider expected payments on these two sets. Under the old and the new contracts,
the payments are:
Pold =
ˆ
A
{R− r}dF(R)+
ˆ
B
{µR−g(R)}dF(R)
Pnew =
ˆ
A
{µR− gˆ(R)}dF(R)+
ˆ
B
{R− r}dF(R)
52
and the difference between the two is:
Bnew−Bold =
ˆ
B
{R− r−µR+g(R)}dF(R)−
ˆ
A
{R− r−µR+ gˆ(R)}dF(R) =
= (1−µ)[
ˆ
B
RdF(R)−
ˆ
A
RdF(R)]−
−r[
ˆ
B
dF(R)−
ˆ
A
dF(R)]+ [
ˆ
B
g(R)dF(R)−
ˆ
A
gˆ(R)dF(R)] =
= (1−µ)[
ˆ
B
RdF(R)−
ˆ
A
RdF(R)]> 0
The last line follows since by construction, we have
´
B dF(R) =
´
A dF(R). Moreover, we have
also constructed gˆ(R) so that
´
B g(R)dF(R) =
´
A gˆ(R)dF(R). Hence, the only remaining term is the
difference between verification costs, which is positive since
´
B dF(R) =
´
A dF(R) and for every R
in A, every R in B is larger and hence expected value of R on B is strictly larger than the expected
value on A. Since 0 < µ < 1, the inequality follows. Consequently, I have established that the
proposed alternative contract is feasible and incentive-compatible, and yet delivers strictly larger
expected profit to the banker. As a result, the original contract could not have been optimal. Q.E.D.
We can now prove the theorem further characterizing the optimal contract.
Theorem: Any solution to problem has the following properties: g?(R) = µAR for R ∈ S. The
cutoff level R˜ is determined as R˜= CA .
Proof: The theorem states that if there is verification, then the depositor receives all the output
net of verification costs and the banker receives nothing. The second part of the theorem states
that given C, the banker only submits to verification if it is not feasible for her to pay the promised
amount C.
The first part is again a proof by contradiction. Suppose that in the optimal contract there exists
an interval P = (R1,R2) for which there is verification (by lemma, this implies that (R2 ≤ R˜) and
the payoff to the banker is strictly positive. I propose an alternative contract where the payoff to
the banker is zero on this interval. Instead, the banker receives slightly larger payoff in states where
there is no verification so that the ex ante expected payoff to the banker is held constant. I also keep
the verification region constant. I will then show that this contract is feasible and it delivers strictly
larger expected utility to the consumer, exploiting consumer’s risk aversion.
First, define the change (a decrease) in the transfer paid to depositors if there is no verification
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(on set S′) by:
a=
´
P[µAR−g(R)]dF(R)´
S′ dF(R)
Since the remainder is paid to the banker, the expected payment to the banker remains the same
by construction. This change is feasible for a (equivalently, P) small enough, since the previous
contract featured payment C to consumer on S and a non-negative payment R−C to banker. New
payments are given by C−a to the consumer and by R−C+a to the banker. If a is small enough,
this change is feasible, and we can make sure this holds by suitably adjusting P.
It remains to show that the new contract is strictly preferred by the consumer. I will do this
by showing that the distribution of depositor’s consumption associated with old contract is a mean-
preserving spread of the distribution imposed by the new contract.
First, it is clear that since realizations of R for which there is verification are the same for both
contracts, and the mean payment to the banker is the same in both contracts, then the mean payment
(and consumption) to the depositor is also the same. However, as I will now show, the distribu-
tion is now more “squeezed”, or less spread. Let us compare cumulative distribution functions of
depositor’s consumption under both contracts. First, note that for a small enough a, the following
inequality holds:
g(R)<C−a∀R ∈ S
This is true, since by IC, we have, for R ∈ S:
µR−g(R) > R−C
g(R) < C− (1−µ)R
Hence, if a < (1− µ)R, then the inequality holds. If a turns out to be too large, then we can
always make it smaller by suitably adjusting the size of interval P.
By incentive compatibility constraint, g(R) < C for every R ∈ S. Define a random variable Xˆ
which gives a size of consumption for the consumer as a function of R.
Xˆ =

g(R) if there is verification
C if there is no verification
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The CDF of Xˆold is then
Fold(X) =

´
1g(R)≤XdF(R) for X <C
1 for X ≥C
And the CDF of Xˆnew is:
Fnew(c) =

´
1gˆ(R)≤XdF(R) for X <C−a
1 for X ≥C−a
Since under the new contract gˆ(R) > g(R) for R ∈ P, as all the payoff previously going to the
banker now goes to the customer, we have
Fnew(X)−Fold(X)

≤ 0 for X <C−a
> 0 for C−a≤ X < r
= 0 for X ≥C
Since Xˆold and Xˆnew by construction have the same mean, this implies that Xˆold is a mean-
preserving spread of Xˆnew. As such, given that u is assumed to be strictly concave5 and strictly
increasing, this implies
Eu(Xˆnew)> Eu(Xˆold)
that is, the new contract delivers strictly higher expected utility to the depositor. This establishes
the contradiction to the initial claim of the old contract being optimal.
We can now prove the second part of the theorem. Again, suppose that the cutoff R˜ was such
that R˜A >C. In this case, there exists an Rˆ < R˜ such that RA >C ∀R > Rˆ, i.e. it is still feasible to
pay C to consumers. Consider an alternative contract that has no bankruptcy for R≥ Rˆ. Since in the
previous part of the theorem I’ve already shown that in the previous contract the payoff to banker
must have been zero on (Rˆ, R˜) and it is now strictly positive on this interval, the bankers are now
strictly better off. Second, since verification was supposed to be optimal for the banker, it must have
5This is not affected by presence of storage, since if u(x) is strictly concave in x, then u(s+x) is also strictly concave in x.
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been that:
g(R)<C∀R ∈ (Rˆ, R˜)
Hence, avoiding bankruptcy on this interval increases consumer’s consumption for all point on
the interval. As a result, both agents are strictly better off, which contradicts the assumption of the
previous verification region being optimal. Loosely speaking, having bankruptcy for realizations of
R that still allow for payments ofC to the consumer means that both sides “leave money on the table”
by contracting on a bankruptcy when it is not necessary. By removing this unnecessary bankruptcy,
both sides can be made better off. Q.E.D.
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